Final answer:
Both LaFollette and Lansing had differing assessments of Germany, with LaFollette blaming Germany for the war and Lansing believing that Germany's actions were a response to perceived threats.
Step-by-step explanation:
Based on the information provided, it is difficult to determine a clear assessment of Germany made by LaFollette and Lansing. However, it can be said that both politicians held the view that Germany was responsible for the war, but they differed in their interpretations of Germany's actions and motivations. LaFollette blamed Germany for the conflict and believed that the war was justified in order to combat German aggression, while Lansing believed that Germany's actions were a response to perceived threats and that the war could have been avoided through diplomatic means.
The 'stab-in-the-back' myth was a fabrication by the German military leadership to shift blame for their inevitable World War I defeat. Historical evidence does not support the idea that Germany could have won if not for internal sabotage, and therefore, assessments based on this myth are incorrect.
Based on historical evidence, it is clear that the assertion of individuals like Hindenburg and Ludendorff about Germany being able to continue fighting during World War I was not accurate. The narrative surrounding the infamous "stab-in-the-back" myth was a fabrication to shift blame away from the military's shortcomings and the reality that Germany was on the brink of defeat by the Allies. This myth was used to promote a politicized agenda and to gain sympathy, leading to significant historical consequences, most notably the rise of the Nazi party and World War II.
The idea that Germany could have continued the war was a convenient lie, but not a reality. The Allies were not weakening but rather were fortified by the arrival of American troops and resources, making Germany's defeat inevitable. Therefore, neither La Follette nor Lansing had an accurate assessment if they subscribed to the stab-in-the-back myth as a pivotal factor in the determination of the war's outcome.