Final answer:
Practitioners may perform unnecessary surgical procedures primarily due to financial gain in a fee-for-service healthcare system. Health maintenance organizations reduce this incentive by providing fixed payments, addressing the problem of moral hazard. Many doctors now work under a blended payment model to further balance these incentives.
Step-by-step explanation:
According to Müllenbeck, some practitioners may be incentivized to run unnecessary surgical procedures when there is no immediate need for them primarily due to financial gain and insurance billing. This issue is linked to the fee-for-service healthcare financing model, where providers are paid for each service they render, potentially leading to an increase in services provided to maximize revenue. In contrast, health maintenance organizations (HMOs) provide a fixed payment to healthcare providers per enrollee, which encourages providers to deliver necessary care efficiently, thus reducing the incentive for unnecessary procedures.
In the fee-for-service model, providers may be tempted to perform additional treatments that may not be medically necessary, as they receive compensation for each service. However, in an HMO setting, a fixed fee per patient can reduce the propensity for such moral hazard because the margin for additional financial gain from unnecessary procedures is diminished. It's important to note that many doctors today receive a combined payment structure that includes elements of managed care and fee-for-service arrangements, balancing the incentives and addressing the risk of moral hazard to some extent.