Final answer:
There might be less disagreement about moral values than it seems because many arguments stem from situational differences rather than fundamental moral principles. Moral realism and science provide examples of how objective truths can be refined through debate. Philosophical challenges to the fact-value distinction and the consideration of moral pluralism show that common ground can exist despite diverse moral frameworks.
Step-by-step explanation:
The question pertains to the notion of why there might be less disagreement about moral values than it seems. On the surface, moral disagreements can appear vast, but if we dig deeper, we may find that these disagreements are oftentimes due to differences in specific situations, interpretations of facts, or definitions of terms, rather than foundational moral principles. For example, two individuals might disagree on the permissibility of euthanasia due to different religious backgrounds, but both could share a foundational belief in the sanctity of life and the importance of minimizing suffering.
Moral realism posits that there are objective moral facts, even if consensus on those facts is lacking. In science, disagreements once existed about the structure of the universe, but that did not make astronomy subjective; rather, it was part of a process of refining understanding. Similarly, moral disagreements can actually help to refine our collective moral understanding.
Hilary Putnam's objection to the fact-value distinction suggests that scientific facts are also established through values like simplicity or coherence, challenging the idea that science and morality operate in fundamentally different realms. In the context of ethics, this implies that moral disagreements might sometimes revolve around situational interpretations rather than the core moral values themselves.
Finally, moral pluralism acknowledges the existence of different moral frameworks, yet this does not necessarily lead to moral relativism where no common ground can be found. Cultural differences can complicate matters, but they do not negate the potential for underlying moral agreements that transcend individual cultures or societies.