Question

Why was Hitler not dettered by the British french guarantee to Poland? ​

Answer 1

Hitler was undeterred by guarantees to Poland due to his confidence in German military strength, Britain and France's history of appeasement, and the Nazi-Soviet Pact which made a Soviet attack unlikely. Moreover, Britain and France's aversion to another war after the harrowing experience of World War I led to inaction that Hitler interpreted as a lack of credibility in their promises to Poland, precipitating the onset of World War II.

Step-by-step explanation:

Adolf Hitler was not deterred by the British-French guarantee to Poland because he was confident in Germany's military strength and believed that Britain and France would not follow through with their pledge of support to Poland. Despite the threat of military intervention outlined in the British and French assurances to Poland, Hitler was emboldened by the policy of appeasement that Britain and France had previously shown towards his expansionist policies. Additionally, the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact provided a strategic advantage that rendered the German-Soviet borders secure, facilitating his decision to invade Poland without fearing immediate Soviet retaliation.

Britain and France's reluctance to engage in military action due to the trauma of World War I and their fear of communism further convinced Hitler that they would likely seek a negotiated solution rather than enter another devastating war. This complacency and hope for peace at almost any cost meant that the guarantees to Poland were not seen as a credible deterrent by Hitler, leading to the commencement of World War II with the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939.

Answer 2

Hitler was confident that the invasion of Poland would result in a short, victorious war for two important reasons. First, he was convinced that the deployment of the world's first armoured corps would swiftly defeat the Polish armed forces in a blitzkrieg offensive. Secondly, he judged the British and French prime-ministers, Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier, to be weak, indecisive leaders who would opt for a peace settlement rather than war.