Question

Started reading Spinoza's Ethics 2 days ago, and it has gone well so far. However, even with its definition at the start of Book II, I struggle to understand Spinoza's use of singular things in propositions after prop. 8. In most of the demonstrations he uses argumenation along the lines of Singular things are not in god's essence as they are not infinite, and hence neither in the essence of his attributes (as they are also their own cause and have necessary existence). Therefore man doesn't have necessary existence being a singular thing However, I don't quite understand how singular things can still be, aka. be in god. My confusion: Since modes are affects of god's attributes they must exist and be infinite. However, can a mode of a mode, or affect of a mode that is infinite be finite since the mode isn't a direct link of substance/god? Is that how singular things come to be? But since god is all encompassing, why aren't these then in his essence, and then have to be necessarily infinite and existant? How can they be outside god if god is the only substance, aka. all that is? Clearly I'm getting something wrong, so any help would be appreciated! a. Finite modes as expressions of God's attributes lack necessary existence due to their dependence on other factors for their existence, distinct from the self-causing nature of God.

b. Finite modes are finite expressions of the infinite attributes of God, displaying limitations in their existence compared to the attributes themselves.

c. Singular things exist within God as expressions or modifications of divine attributes but do not possess the same infinite and necessary nature as those attributes.

d. All of the above.

Answer 1

The correct answer is option c. Singular things exist within God as expressions or modifications of divine attributes but do not possess the same infinite and necessary nature as those attributes.

Step-by-step explanation:

Singular things in Spinoza's Ethics refer to individual entities or objects. According to Spinoza, these singular things exist within God as expressions or modifications of divine attributes. However, they do not possess the same infinite and necessary nature as those attributes. While modes are infinite expressions of God's attributes, finite modes, or singular things, display limitations in their existence compared to the attributes themselves.

For example, let's consider a tree. The tree is a singular thing, a finite mode, that exists within God as a modification of one or more attributes. However, the tree is not infinite and necessary like the attributes themselves. It is dependent on other factors for its existence, such as sunlight, water, and soil.

Therefore, although it exists within God, it does not possess the same infinite and necessary nature as God's attributes.