Final answer:
Moral realists object to the fact-value distinction because it strengthens ethical relativism, suggesting it prevents moral objectivity and contributes to a view where morals are seen as inherently subjective.
Step-by-step explanation:
Moral realists object to the fact-value distinction because they claim it strengthens ethical relativism. They argue that by maintaining a strict separation between facts (objective realities) and values (subjective assertions), it undermines the possibility of moral objectivity. Further elevating the philosophical stance of moral realism, they suggest that this distinction contributes to a worldview where moral claims cannot be true or false in any meaningful sense, making ethical debates seem subjective and potentially unresolvable.
Moreover, critics like Hilary Putnam have argued that even in the scientific process, supposedly factual conclusions rely on evaluative judgments, thus blurring the line between facts and values. The moral realist position holds that there are moral truths that exist independently of our beliefs, akin to scientific facts, thereby rejecting the strict fact-value distinction and advocating for an objective basis for morality.