Final answer:
A Terry stop does not permit significant involuntary transport of a suspect, as it may convert the stop into a de facto arrest, requiring additional legal protections for the suspect under the Constitution. Instances where significant transport occurs could lead to constitutional violations and necessitate the invocation of Miranda rights.
Step-by-step explanation:
The question is concerning the constraints of Terry stops, a type of police encounter defined by the landmark Supreme Court decision Terry v. Ohio. According to this ruling, police may stop a person if they have reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime and may frisk the suspect for weapons if there is reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. The factor referred to in the question appears to concern the transport or relocation of a suspect during such a stop. The Supreme Court has indicated that a Terry stop does not permit any significant transport or relocation of the suspect involuntarily without affecting the constitutionality of the encounter.
Moreover, drawing from the principles established in Miranda v. Arizona, during any custodial situation, there are procedural safeguards required to protect the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Any significant deprivation of freedom, such as an involuntary transport, could convert the Terry stop into a de facto arrest, which requires mirandizing the individual and potentially changes the legal standards and protections involved.
In conclusion, during a Terry stop, significant involuntary transport of the person stopped is generally not permissible without shifting the nature of the encounter and potentially violating the suspect's constitutional rights.