Final answer:
The U.S. policy of defending against limited attacks by 'rogue' states rather than major nuclear powers is based on nuclear deterrence strategy, particularly Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), which presupposes that a credible nuclear arsenal deters adversaries from attacking for fear of devastating retaliation.
Step-by-step explanation:
Nuclear Deterrence Strategy and U.S. Missile Defense Policy, The United States' policy to only defend against a limited attack by a 'rogue' state rather than a massive attack by a country like Russia or China is rooted in the principles of nuclear deterrence strategy.
This strategy, often characterized by the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), relies on the assumption that the possession of a substantial nuclear arsenal would deter a potential adversary from launching an attack due to the fear of an inevitable, devastating retaliation.
The policy of deterrence requires that the adversary believes that the U.S. really would respond with nuclear weapons, and this belief was publicly reinforced by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who stated any attack would be met with immediate nuclear assault.
During the Cold War, the nuclear arms race led to both the United States and the Soviet Union building up massive arsenals, including Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), to maintain a credible deterrent capability. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the concept of massive retaliation ensured the United States had a second-strike capability that could withstand a first strike, reinforcing the deterrent effect.
President Eisenhower's strategy, known as New Look, embraced nuclear 'massive retaliation' as a cheaper alternative to matching the conventional forces of the USSR. Similarly, Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) aimed at defending against missile attacks, although critics highlighted technical challenges and the potential for countermeasures.
The development and potential use of nuclear weapons by states such as North Korea pose challenges to the deterrence model due to the unpredictability of 'rogue' state actions, necessitating a tailored missile defense system. This system seeks to protect against limited attacks but is not designed to counter a full-scale assault by major nuclear powers, which continues to be deterred by the principle of MAD.