Question

While game theory predicts non-cooperative behavior for a one-shot Prisoner's dilemma. By repeating the game, say 20 rounds, it becomes possible to adopt more complex strategies that allow cooperative play as a Nash Equilibrium in at least some rounds of the game.

A. True
B. False

Answer 1

The statement that in a 20-round repeated Prisoner's dilemma, cooperative play can emerge as a Nash Equilibrium is true because players can adopt complex strategies like t i t - for - t a t or forgiveness, encouraging mutual cooperation over multiple interactions. Therefore, the statement is A) true.

Step-by-step explanation:

In a one-shot Prisoner's dilemma, the dominant strategy for each player is to defect, resulting in a suboptimal outcome for both. However, when the game is repeated multiple times, players have the opportunity to employ more complex strategies, such as t i t - for - t a t or forgiving strategies, that promote cooperation as a Nash Equilibrium in certain rounds.

T i t - for - t a t involves starting with cooperation and then mirroring the opponent's previous move in subsequent rounds. This approach encourages cooperation as long as the opponent reciprocates. Forgiving strategies involve occasional cooperation even after the opponent's defection, fostering a cooperative environment over repeated interactions.

These strategies demonstrate that in iterated versions of the Prisoner's dilemma, cooperative play can evolve as a stable outcome, challenging the prediction of non-cooperative behavior in a one-shot game. Therefore, the statement is A) true.